US has ‘reservations’ about mediation

The Kathmandu Post: Your Excellency, you have been in Nepal for about three months. What is you impression about Nepal’s political situation? James  Moriarty: It surprises me how far the Maoists have gotten…actually we didn’t realize fully back in Washington the degree to which they have made progress and the degree to which they are able to intimidate people, disrupt normal life and try to force their agenda on the country. That’s is the biggest surprise. On the other hand, I am actually encouraged that the new coalition government is formed and it is hanging together pretty well and is trying to address the question of peace negotiations. TKP: Are you surprised only by their capacity to intimidate people or also by their military capacity?

Moriarty: I would say primarily the former. They obviously don’t have the strength to take the RNA [Royal Nepalese Army] head on. So, I haven’t seen huge military progress by the Maoists but I have seen them being able to use the tactics of terror to intimidate people. TKP: Has there been any change in your policy regarding the Maoists after you came here?

Moriarty: I don’t think we have changed anything but we are concentrating more on Nepal. And again because of the growing perception in Washington that the Maoists really have pretty dramatic advancement in the last couple of years. TKP: Isn’t it true that you also changed your emphasis on the need for multiparty government in Nepal? Moriarty: I would quibble a little bit on that assertion. My predecessor was very clearly in favor of multiparty democracy and continued to say it. But people weren’t listening to that. And I don’t know why that was. But I talked to him, I talked to people who served with him and I looked at the public record of his comments and I found nothing that would indicate the lack of support for multiparty democracy. As I said before there was a firm belief in Washington that what we need here is a peaceful and democratic Nepal. And I haven’t changed that after my arrival. Again, focus, concentration might have changed to some degree.

TKP: What is the essence of that new focus and concentration?

Moriarty: Part of it is to see whether we can energize ourselves, whether we can be outspoken to the extent we can while being careful not to interfere in any terms. We are being very outspoken in our support for multiparty democracy and the need for unity among the legitimate political forces for the peaceful resolution to the Maoist insurgency.

TKP: Don’t you think that the Royal Palace is looking for some kind of role for itself in the upcoming political structure that we may arrive at? Moriarty: I think the number one interest of the Royal Palace is preservation of constitutional monarchy. And I think the Palace has learnt from what happened since October 2002 up until July this year. It can’t stand by itself; it needs to work with legitimate political forces. I won’t disregard or try to minimize the distrust between the Palace and the political parties but both are beginning to understand that the biggest threat to both of them and the [1990] Constitution as a whole comes from the Maoists. TKP: Another lot of US weapons for the army arrived last week, how do you explain that?

Moriarty: Actually, what arrived in Kathmandu last week was nothing for the army at all. It was for the police, actually APF [Armed Police Force] unit, that deals with terrorism hostage taking. We are hoping to train and equip Nepali APF unit in that area.

TKP: How do you assess the performance of the Royal Nepalese Army in containing the Maoist guerillas and brining them to the negotiating table?

Moriarty: What we have always been saying is we don’t see a military solution to this conflict. You need a negotiated settlement to bring majority of the Maoists back into the mainstream. But to get there the Maoists have to make serious compromises at the negotiating table. And for the Maoists to make compromises, you will have to have several factors at place. First, the Maoists have to see unity among the legitimate political forces, and the legitimate political forces have to consistently say that this is our bottomline; we support each other and you are not going to divide us. And I think there has been fairly good progress in that direction and that is one reason for optimism. Secondly, there has to be an international environment that pushes the Maoists to make those compromises. And the third thing in need is the realization among the Maoists that they are not going to win; they are not going to militarily defeat the RNA; and in the long run, their situation is only going to deteriorate. We need all those factors in place before you are going to force the Maoists to make compromises at the negotiating table.

TKP: You had visited India just before Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba’s state visit to India. What sort of change did you find in India vis-à-vis the Maoists? Moriarty: I think there has been a big change over the past year. I think the government, civil society, and media in India have all begun to realize that the Maoists not only pose a threat to the government of Nepal but also pose a threat to stability in larger parts of India. I think before that there wasn’t a real consensus on how serious threat the Maoists posed to the government of Nepal, and there was even less acknowledgment on how serious threat Maoists posed to India. That has changed quite a bit and I think Indian policies are reflecting it. TKP: It seems that we are in need of international or third party mediation and the Maoists have also been demanding the involvement of international bodies in the peace process, how do you see that?

Moriarty: We have reservations about mediation, my government does. Mediation means there are two parties and a third party sitting in between. It not only facilitates the discussion but also makes substantive suggestions. Side A suggested this, side B suggested that; why don’t I suggest something sort of in between or something from out here. I don’t think any outside power has the ability to do that, and I also think that any outside power making this suggestion will be inevitably forcing the sides to be a part of it. Now, people might say what’s wrong with the compromise. It’s okay if you consider these two parties are sharing the shame goal—a peaceful resolution of the insurgency will lead to the preservation of multiparty democracy. I am not sure that the Maoists really have that goal. Their goal is to achieve power. We should not be naïve that they have given up what they have been doing for the past eight years. It doesn’t really look like they will come to multiparty democracy; may be forced to at some point, but it doesn’t look they are ready yet. So, under these conditions what sort of compromise should be made between the side that wants to preserve multiparty democracy and the side that wants one-party rule? While a compromise may come something at the middle. And what’s the middle? Does that mean setting up a system where the Maoists have sufficient power that they are happy? Does that mean when they have sufficient power later on that they can use that power to gain the rest of the power? That’s why [my] government is not comfortable with the concept of mediation right now, particularly when the Maoists are not giving any sign that their real goal is multiparty democracy. They are giving plenty of sign that their real goal is absolute power. But we don’t have any opposition to [outside] facilitation. I will tell you tough that the Indian government seems pretty reluctant even on that. And they have some reason that actually makes sense. They have lots of Maoists in jail right now. If the third party facilitating the discussion would be somehow in a position to say that India is also a part of the problem and they should be releasing the Maoists, then Indians are uncomfortable to that sort of pressure.

TKP: But what the Maoists are saying is, the past governments did not acknowledge, actually backtracked, on some of the agreements reached during the last peace talks; therefore, they say they want third party neutral to witness the agreements and make sure that they are acknowledged later on.

Moriarty: I am not going into the history of the past negotiations but people give completely different analysis of what happened. On the other hand my government has no position on the question of having some sort of authorities sitting there. But what the government is proposing now, I believe, is secret talks. What is wrong with that? Bilateral secret talks by definition are done outside the glare of media. I think part of the problem you had last time around was you had both sides having to play to public. I don’t see anything wrong or particularly dangerous to the Maoist basic principles to go with the bilateral secret talks. TKP: But if there is no mediation, facilitation or involvement of an international organization, problem may arise while disarming the Maoists?

Moriarty: What we are looking at is the situation today where you do not have effective talks for a while and the past talks were pretty unsuccessful. So, what you are looking at is how you move forward. Ultimately, sure there is going to be outside involvement in the peace process. I am not saying there can’t be outside involvement. But the ideal situation is you come to an agreement where the Maoists agree to become a legitimate political party participating in elections, laying down their weapons. In that case, yes there might be outsiders overseeing elections, laying down of arms and rehabilitation, among others. I am not saying there won’t be outside involvement in the future. TKP: There is an impression in Nepal that the US overreacted to the Maoist bombing at the USIS office by withdrawing Peace Corps volunteers. What do you say?

Moriarty: When I came here, one of the first things I had to do was to look at the safety of the volunteers. I decided by the end of July that they were reasonably safe. Then the Maoists had not attacked American facility, nor had they attacked any Westerner. But on September 13, we went with the recommendation that the program be temporarily suspended. Now let’s see what had happened in the intervening months. The American center got bombed; about the same time up in Dolpa we had an American NGO staff beaten up by the local Maoist commander for no reason. And the Maoists went to many NGOs where our volunteers were working and asked them to leave. In the meantime, they had also announced the closure of the industries and issued statements against India. Now, given all that, do you think an American ambassador could sit here on September 13 and not decide anything on American Peace Corps volunteers?

TKP: Now, what are the preconditions for Peace Corps volunteers to resume their works?

Moriarty: The Maoists have to assure us. They could issue a statement saying that no foreign volunteer will be harassed in villages; no foreign volunteer will be beaten or attacked; no foreign diplomatic property will be attacked. If they could say that publicly, we’ll probably get the volunteers back. TKP: Is there any US security assistance in the pipeline for Nepal?

Moriarty: We have announced about a million-dollar assistance immediately after the bombing [at the American center]. We are looking at additional assistance but for the reason of our budgetary cycle in the Congress it probably would not come until December.